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The “Tin Openers” Myth and Reality: Intelligence from U-boat Wrecks 
During WW1 
Dr. Innes McCartney 
Introduction 
In producing this paper for the Historical Diving Society the attempt has been made to develop a 
factual account of the extent of the diving carried out on U-boat wrecks during WW1. It draws on a 
wide range of sources from the archival through to the author’s investigations of the U-boat wrecks 
themselves.  
The divers who visited the then recently sunken U-boats did so for the sole purpose of intelligence 
gathering. Intelligence came mainly in the form of charts, codebooks, call signs, technical and 
personnel data. The intelligence war against the U-boats was secret. Little except hearsay emerged 
until 1969-70 with the release of much of what is now known as ADM 116 and ADM 137 to the 
National Archives; within which is a rich source of data.  
The information vacuum which lasted for over half a century after WW1 was fertile ground for 
rumour and hearsay; some of the legacies of which have endured to the present. As a guide to new 
readers and researchers of this period, the key milestones in the development of the mythology of 
the “Tin Openers” are described in the postscript.  
This paper gives a brief history of the Admiralty Salvage Section and then goes on to show how the 
process of gathering intelligence from the wrecks was refined throughout the war. Like so much of 
the history of WW1, the processes required to achieve success in prizing intelligence from U-boat 
wrecks took time to evolve and perfect and did not reach its apogee until the summer of 1918. The 
story of this development in process will be highlighted by examples from archival research and 
ultimately from the wrecks themselves.  
Figure 7 and Table 1 provide a full list of all the sites the author has confirmed as having been dived 
on during WW1, giving brief details of each case. The list is based mainly on the records of the 
Admiralty Salvage Section, Dover Command and the Intelligence Division, backed up by the UK 
Hydrographic Office database and the author’s own dives. This list does not include cases where 
wrecks were searched for by vessels and not found. Unless there is specific evidence that divers 
were actually dropped in the ocean during the searches, the cases are not listed. 
The Admiralty Salvage Section in WW1 
The Admiralty Salvage Section, under whose governance much of the U-boat diving took place was 
formed at the end of 1915 as a branch of DNE (Director of Naval Equipment) to meet the increased 
requirements of marine salvage in wartime. The U-boats were far from its sole purpose and were 
largely separate and incidental to its main function.  
Commodore Fred Young, RNR became its head and oversaw its development throughout the war. 
Young, who had been chief salvage officer at the Liverpool Salvage Association, also took command 
of one of the earliest U-boat cases the Salvage Section were involved in, the recovery whole of UC5. 
In December 1917, the Salvage Section was expanded when it effectively took over all salvage 
operations, cutting out commercial firms which up that point had also been salvaging wrecks.  
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By 1918 the Section had grown to operate 15 salvage ships. Its headquarters staff reached 10 
officers and 22 civilian support staff. Working on the wrecks were 9 commissioned salvage officers 
and 19 assistant salvage officers. It is credited with recovering around 450 ships, which were 
returned to service. The Salvage Section was disbanded in 1919, although one vessel, Racer was 
retained for work on the wreck of HMS Laurentic. 
Of the vessels operated by the Salvage Section, at least seven are known to have been deployed to 
U-boat work; the submarine recovery barge YC-10 (for the lift of UB110) and the vessels Anchorite, 
Ranger, Melita, Racer, Corycia and Moonfleet. The salvage officers who worked on U-boats are 
known to have been Commanders Young, Davis, McGuffie, Malet, Vine, Wheeler, Kay, George and 
Damant.  
In the summer of 1918, when the number of U-boats being destroyed inshore rose, Damant and 
Moonfleet were deployed specifically to U-boat work. It is at this time that divers succeeded in 
extracting intelligence from the U-boat wrecks. But before this happened, much had to be learned 
about the necessary processes needed to successfully seize intelligence from the deep. 
1915-16: Beginnings 
It is within the records of the Admiralty Salvage Section that much of our current knowledge of the 
U-boats dived resides. While the Salvage Section made more U-boat dives than any other agency, it 
is also clear that during 1915-18, Royal Navy and civilian divers searched for U-boat wrecks with 
mixed results. The first two cases predate the deployment of the Admiralty Salvage Section divers 
and they are both interesting case studies into the challenges faced at the time. 
 
The former case involves the wreck of UC2 which detonated one of her own mines while laying a 
field in the Stanford Channel, Great Yarmouth on 2 July 1915 (see Figure 7). The mine detonation 
suggested the presence of a U-boat and it was duly located by minesweepers. In only 9.5 fathoms, 
Chatham Dockyard divers were swiftly on the wreck and were able to make a full appraisal of what 
Figure 1. Diagram of the wreck of UC2 as sketched by Cmdr. Ballard of HMS Halcyon in August 1915. The 
details came from two divers, Severs & Bridges who were commended for their work (National Archives).  
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was present. The sketch made is the most detailed one from WW1 the author has found and is 
shown in Figure 1 above.  
Clearly the shallow depth assisted the divers in their work, allowing for a detailed survey to take 
place. Interestingly, although the local commander believed it a simple task to recover the forward 
portion of the wreck for the purposes of gathering intelligence, Admiral Oliver at the Admiralty 
ordered the wreck to be blown up. All that was learned of what was there came from the sketches. 
Clearly at this time the value of what could be retrieved from the wreck was either not recognised or 
was outweighed by other considerations. Even the U-boat’s identity was unknown at the time. 
In this instance there was the strong case for a U-boat being present, an accurate position to search, 
shallow water for the divers to work in and two proficient divers, Leading Seaman Severs and Petty 
Officer Bridges to do the survey work and latterly the demolition. However circumstances were 
unusually cooperative in this case and things did not always run as smoothly. 
The latter of these two cases, in January 1916, is equally educative, but in the opposite way. The 
Dover Harbour Master, under orders from Vice Admiral Dover employed a local dockyard diver to 
locate a supposed sunk U-boat. A summary of the memo to the Admiralty from Vice Admiral Dover 
reads as:  
“The dockyard diver was sent down on 16th January and reported that the obstruction 
grappled was a submarine. He explained to me that he knew it to be so by it being a round 
hull...I consider the report of the diver conclusive. In fact, so sure was he that, contrary to 
custom, he was quite keen to go down again on the submarine.” 
Besides the natural reaction of the diver to say anything an admiral may want to hear, two things are 
highlighted by this episode. First, the diver required some guidance and training into what to look 
for. Second, the grappling for U-boat wrecks after the reported sinking event in most cases did not 
find a U-boat, because it wasn’t there in the first place, (see No U-boat “a” in Figure 7).  
In this instance, the event of 11 January 1916 involved the supposed ramming of a U-boat by the 
yacht James Fletcher. History records no U-boats sunk during this period. However the “discovery” 
of its wreck by the diver led to a £1,000 payout to the crew of the yacht. Later in the war, as will be 
shown, even experienced divers such as Warrant Shipwright E. C. Miller were to make similar 
misattributions when assuming a U-boat wreck must be at the bottom of the shot line, when in 
reality none was sunk at the time.  
The first case involving the Admiralty Salvage Section divers was the recovery whole of UC5 from 
Shipwash Bank, where it ran aground on 27 April 1916. By 16 May the U-boat had been recovered to 
the beach near Harwich pier. Some intelligence was recovered although much had been disposed of 
by the crew before they attempted to scuttle the U-boat. An Intelligence Division translation of the 
navigator’s notebooks was published in June. Since the enemy knew it had run aground it was 
presumably considered to have fallen into British hands. The Admiralty therefore had nothing to lose 
and everything to gain by recovering it. 
So by the end of 1916, a total of three cases had been investigated by divers, with varying results. It 
is interesting to observe that in all the cases the intelligence value of what might be gathered from 
the wrecks appears hardly to have been recognised. During the following year a further seven cases 
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involving sunken U-boats were investigated and the intelligence potential of what could be extracted 
from the wrecks became clear.  
The year 1917 proved to be the turning point not only in the U-boat war itself but also in the way in 
which the Salvage Section and the Admiralty came to view what could be achieved by diving on the 
wrecks. WW1 was very much a war in which the coming to grips with modern technologies proved 
crucial. Likewise for the divers, 1917 was to be the year of learning, from which the successes of 
1918 would emerge. 
1917: The Year of Learning 
With hindsight the sinking of the liner serving as an auxiliary cruiser, HMS Laurentic on 25 January 
1917 proved to be a key moment in the Tin Openers tale, although initially this was not recognised. 
The ship had been carrying 43 tons of gold bullion to pay for the war. Its recovery from the wreck 
was a strategic necessity. To achieve this from the depth of 22 fathoms, on 1 February the Salvage 
Section received Lt. Cmdr. G.C.C. Damant RN on secondment. Damant was a leading deep-diving and 
decompression expert and the retired Navy Inspector of Diving. He had the experience to conduct 
dives in open water to depths to which most Salvage Section divers did not venture. Just promoted 
to Warrant Shipwright, Miller followed Damant in July, also on secondment. 
 
 
 
Dives by naval divers in March off Sunderland recovered items from UC32, including a torpedo. Also 
a Intelligence Division translation of UC32’s “Machinery History” was published in May 1917. The 
original could only have come from the wreck, either by divers or as flotsam. Perhaps this further 
indicated the potential for papers to be found within sunken U-boats. In December Damant, finished 
with the Laurentic salvage (see Figure 2) and in Portsmouth having completed a mining course at 
Figure 2. The HMS Laurentic salvage team, probably after WW1. Now Commander, Damant is seated third 
from the left. It is likely that some of the others in this photo were part of the Special Section of 1918, probably 
to his right is Miller (David Masters).  
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HMS Vernon, supervised his first submarine project with the diving on UB81, although in this 
instance the divers were specifically aiding in an abortive attempt to recover the U-boat whole (see 
Figure 7). The team contained Salvage Officer Davis and the riggers who worked on UC44.  
In fact it was the recovery whole in September of UC44 off Dunmore, Ireland by Davis in Racer, 
(using the two divers who worked on UC5) which proved for the Salvage Section to be the 
intelligence coup of 1917 (see Figure 3). Undoubtedly this was a key milestone in the understanding 
of what intelligence treasure troves sunken U-boats could yield. An Intelligence Division translation 
of UC44’s “Machinery History” was published in January 1918. But equally the fact that the U-boat 
was beached in view of the public meant enemy discovery could not be discounted. Diving covertly, 
offered a far more secret way to gather valuable intelligence, if it could be achieved. 
 
 
 
This might also be the reason why the salvage of UC41 in the Tay estuary being conducted by 
Salvage Officer McGuffie aboard Melita was cancelled in October. In this case the lifting wires were 
in place and salvage barge LC3 was ready. Salvage was reported as certainly possible, but the records 
do not detail why the cancellation took place, except to say it was “not desirable”. The record refers 
to a naval officer, Lt. George returning to London with the confidential books (presumably the 
Intelligence Division series of publications on U-boat technology) just prior to the cancellation order. 
This has been misconstrued by previous historians as an episode where intelligence had been 
recovered. There is no evidence any was found. In fact confidential books had to be kept locked 
away. It is noted that McGuffie retained one copy of a book, when in fact Melita may not have had 
secure storage (it is known Corycia did not until Damant requested it). In May 1918 he was dismissed 
from the Salvage Section for incompetence and it is possible the retention of confidential books 
played a part in this. 
Figure 3. UC44 secured from the sea between two lifting vessels. This was the first great intelligence coup 
involving the Salvage Section. Salvage Officer Davis is seen standing in the foreground on the lifting vessel 
(David Masters).  
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Three unsuccessful cases (two in 1917 and one in early 1918) were perhaps even more educative 
than the successful ones in helping formulate policy in the future and they are worthy of some 
examination. The two unsuccessful cases of 1917 both involved some contribution from the Salvage 
Section. In the first case, off Penzance in May, a diver from Falmouth dockyard was deployed to find 
and confirm the destruction of a U-boat. Despite several attempts at the extreme depth of around 
29 fathoms, only rocks were found. No U-boat is recorded as having been lost in this area, so 
consequently none was found (see No U-boat “b” in Figure 7). 
In the second case, the Dover Command records reveal that it repeated the James Fletcher episode 
mentioned above, paying out £300 in November to the crew of HMAT Wren for the destruction of a 
U-boat off Dungeness on 4 August (see No U-boat “c” in Figure 7). This entire case contains an 
element of farce. It is recorded that on 13 September the wreck of a U-boat was identified by divers 
from Dover, in a search initiated on behalf of Wren’s claim for prize money by the Captain of the 
Trawler Patrol. This immediately led to Salvage Officer, Commander Malet with YC Anchorite being 
ordered to Dover to begin salvage operations. The wreck was duly found and inspected on 28 
September by salvage diver Self. This led to the somewhat ironic message: 
“Commander Malet reports supposed submarine destroyed by Wren is an old wreck” 
Clearly infuriated by this turn of events, Captain Trawler Patrol commissioned his own trawler 
equipped with divers from Inland Water Transport to find the errant submarine. Three wrecks and 
an anchor were found and Self’s inspection was also reconfirmed. Unsurprisingly they did not find 
the U-boat wreck, because records show it was never there in the first place as no U-boats were lost 
at that time. Nevertheless such persistence paid off with the £300 reward being granted. 
The third case in March to April 1918 describes how divers Miller and Oats were ordered to 
Falmouth on 24 March 1918. The following day Miller reported diving a U-boat in 21 fathoms off 
Newquay, which was lying on is port beam and broken amidships (see No U-boat “d” on Figure 7). 
Miller even drew a sketch (see Figure 4) to show the position of the shotline and the orientation of 
the wreck. Conditions were reported as being very tough with strong current and tidal surges, 
making in water decompression impossible. Salvage was not recommended by Miller, but Young 
noted that its location made it a tempting target. Finally on 24 April after an abortive search in 
Harwich in which no wreck was found, Damant visited the wreck site in a launch and confirmed 
conditions were not favourable and the project was abandoned. 
What makes this case so interesting is that records show that the only U-boat operating in the area 
at the time of the reported sinking was U55 which survived. In fact no U-boats are now known to 
have been sunk in the area and the supposed wreck has never shown up, despite searches as recent 
as 2013 on the bearings reported by Miller. Whatever Miller did actually see, it was not a U-boat. 
From Salvage Section records it appears this was Miller’s first dive to examine a U-boat and one has 
to conclude that a lack of prior experience with U-boats was contributory to this false report. 
Interestingly, whether the Intelligence Division knew this case was a red herring is an interesting 
question, mainly because it is one of the only instances of wartime U-boat diving to be published 
during the period of secrecy after the war, when this episode is described in Newbolt’s 1918 book. If 
false, what was the harm in releasing the details? (see Postscript). 
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This was not an auspicious start to a year which very shortly thereafter became characterised by 
success. The lessons of 1917 led to changes in policy in the Salvage Section itself but equally 
important were the restructuring at the Admiralty at the end of 1917 and similar organisational 
changes in the Dover Command at the same time, without which little would have changed. 
 
 
 
In brief, in December 1917 at the Admiralty, failure to get to grips with the U-boat war saw the 
centralisers, Jellicoe and Oliver moved out and Wemyss moved in as First Sea Lord. This coincided 
with a significant decentralisation and expansion of the Intelligence Division, which was to 
significantly benefit the Salvage Section’s U-boat efforts. It has been said that this restructuring led 
to an intelligence organisation more akin to that seen in the Admiralty in WW2. 
At Dover, by December 1917, the minefield (which finally shut off the Channel to U-boats in 
September 1918 and created several relatively easily accessible U-boat wrecks) was being 
completed. When ordered to, Admiral Bacon of the Dover Command refused to illuminate it, fearing 
a German raid. When compelled to do so, the same night saw a U-boat (UB56) dive into the 
minefield to its destruction. This episode, compounded by his association with Jellicoe saw Bacon 
dismissed. In came the aggressive Keyes who took a keen interest in the activities of the divers. 
1918: The Year of Success 
The winds of change at the Admiralty were not slow to reach the Salvage Section. The office staff 
became signatories to the Official Secrets Act in January, enabling them to handle secret 
information. Importantly on 29 March, a memo from Director Intelligence Division proposed the 
establishment under two officers and four divers of a Special Section dedicated to salvage work on 
Figure 4. Diagram of the wreck of the submarine (No U-boat “d” on Figure XXX), as sketched by diver EC Miller 
in March 1918. Miller was commended for his work on this site, but records show no U-boat was sunk and no 
wreck has been found (National Archives).  
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U-boats. It was to be trained by intelligence officers in the details of enemy submarines and 
weapons and was to be on standby for any opportunities. Damant and Miller were ordered to set it 
up and by May it was operational, with Damant promoted to acting Commander. Moreover, Director 
DNE was to be given access to reports of sunken U-boats from which to make suggestions as to 
which cases may lend themselves to salvage work. 
It also is interesting to note that during March 1918, the entire staff and structure of the Salvage 
Section itself was also subject to reorganisation. While probably aimed at dealing with its increased 
workload, it seems also to have had a number of repercussions regarding U-boat work. The Salvage 
Section was able to issue a Fleet Order in May directing how sunken submarines were to be correctly 
buoyed, before requesting divers to examine them. In fact, the Salvage Section made it clear to its 
local offices that salvage divers would not be made available to check U-boat positions in the future. 
This was the sole preserve of the Special Section under Damant and they were not to be called upon 
for “expeditions which have often proved fruitless.” Sites were expected to be confirmed U-boat 
kills, located and properly buoyed before the Special Section would be sent. 
The Special Section is forever associated with the tug Moonfleet. Built in Millwall in 1917 and 
destined for Argentina, it was requisitioned in November and converted into a diving vessel. 
Moonfleet was a 100ft steel ship of 145 tons. It proved too small for the decompression chamber 
allocated to it which was not fitted. Divers were trained on Moonfleet specifically for U-boat work 
and it was accepted in the Salvage Section as a specialised skill. The names of some of the divers 
who worked on Moonfleet are also recorded and notably include Miller, Leading Seaman Edwin 
Blachford and Able Seaman George Clear, all who had worked on Laurentic and had been specially 
requested by Damant to form the core divers of the Special Section. They were not paid, nor trained 
as salvage divers, but came to specialise in their own brand of recovery work. 
So it was in early May that the Special Section in the newly fitted out Moonfleet began work. Its first 
case proved frustrating. UB16 had been torpedoed off Harwich and its commander (Olzs. von der 
Lühe) plucked from the sea but minesweepers failed to locate the main body of the wreck and the 
divers only found pieces. Now working closely with the Intelligence Division’s Cmdr Cooper, this case 
was abandoned on 19 May and the Special Section headed to Dover.  
Two days later work began on UB33 which had been mined on 11 April. With the wreck found and 
securely buoyed, the Special Section began work. After surveying the wreck, which was found to 
have been mined aft, the commander’s (Olzs. F Gregor) body was recovered from the conning 
tower, inspected by Cooper of the Intelligence Division and after several items had been found, it 
was buried at sea. A largely factually correct account of the diving on this wreck was published by R 
H Davis in 1935. Davis certainly knew some of the protagonists. He states that the commander was 
found to have been shot in the stomach and head. It was presumed that this happened to prevent 
him from opening the conning tower hatch to escape from the sunken U-boat. 
On Damant’s recommendation, full recovery of the wreck was cancelled and the divers went to work 
to recover whatever intelligence they could find. Four days later, the divers, experienced with 
explosive charges from their work on Laurentic, blasted off the conning tower with 45lbs of TNT. The 
following day the bridge helm and compass were recovered and the lower hatch blasted open, 
allowing the divers inside. It was noticed that the explosion had set one of the torpedoes running 
and it was found hanging half way out of its tube.  
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Now on the scent of treasure of a different nature, Miller was noted as working particularly 
zealously and was rewarded on 29 May with the first great intelligence haul recovered by a diver 
from a U-boat during the war; which must have contributed greatly to his 1919 DSC awarded for 
“distinguished services in connection with dangerous and important salvage work”. The same 
evening a car with the “heavy” precious cargo delivered it to the Admiralty.  
Two days later the Special Section was ordered to Immingham, where the usual frustrations 
returned when the wreck (supposedly UC75) could not be located and only the long sunk UC39 was 
found and examined. The next case in Harwich brought further success and also a salutary lesson in 
the use of explosives on sunken U-boats.  
ON 26 June UC11 had been witnessed to sink after striking a mine it had laid on an earlier patrol. 
Easily located and buoyed, the Special Section were on the wreck two days later. Employing the 
same method as on UB33, this time 100lb of TNT liberated the conning tower on the 30th. The 
following day another 100lb was used to open up the lower hatch. This caused a sympathetic 
detonation of the U-boats mines (which had been noted as still being fully on board). Valuable 
intelligence floated to the surface and the divers found more in the wreck. The following day the 
Special Section left for Dover, where it remained for three months. Miller was transferred to Davis 
aboard Corycia in June to work on UB74 off Portland. The two other divers aboard Moonfleet, who 
had come from the Laurentic salvage team now come to the fore; Blachford and Clear. The names of 
other Navy divers who possibly worked on Moonfleet during this time are not recorded apart from 
PO Balson who was aboard until 19 June. During the summer of 1918 Damant continually reported 
he was short of divers. 
Dover, with its well patrolled and extensively buoyed minefield offered the best possibilities to 
locate sunken U-boats to dive. Work on a number of sites followed, interspersed with the discovery 
of mined U-boats which were considered too old to yield valuable intelligence. A list of the sites 
dived is given in Table 1. Until late August, rewards for persistently trying to recover intelligence 
from the wrecks remained scarce, with only UB55 yielding “some material”. The use of explosives 
was reluctantly used on UC64 to affect entry into the control room, but fell out of favour after an 
attempt to blow out the forward hatch of UB55 resulted in the detonation of at least one torpedo.  
The Special Section began its final run of successful cases on 29 August when it arrived on top of the 
wreck of the mined UB109 just after the last survivors had been rescued. Noting that the use of 
explosives would not be used, they forced their entry into the control room by entering the wreck 
through the forward hatch and passing out the bodies and other material recovered through the 
conning tower. The “inside” divers are mentioned as Blachford and Clear. They were the ones who 
had to squeeze inside the hatchways and work in unimaginably difficult conditions. A great haul of 
fresh intelligence emerged. This ended Moonfleet’s diving in the Dover area until after the war. 
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Moving north, Damant and the Special Section this time aboard Corycia worked on the recently 
discovered wreck of UC70 off Whitby from 4 October. Working as they had on UB109, with one diver 
inside and one by the hatch, they slowly cleared the wreck, searching for intelligence. The non use of 
explosives made the work hard going but afforded the divers the opportunity to see a fresh U-boat 
wreck in detail.  
“Inside” divers (Blachford and Clear are mentioned again) noted that some of the crew had probably 
been alive on the bottom after it sunk. One body at least had its throat cut. Also several locked steel 
boxes, resembling the type found in UB33 which held the first great intelligence haul were recovered 
and found to contain nothing more than tinned food and sausages. The locked canvas bag recovered 
contained potatoes; such was the state of food shortages in Germany. Finally on October 14 they 
reached the wireless room and “valuable material” was on its way to London (see Figure 5). Both 
divers received the DSM in July 1919. As with Miller’s DSC it is not explicit whether it was awarded 
for their work on Laurentic, U-boats or both. 
An abortive case off the Tees followed before Damant and Corycia made their way to Scapa Flow for 
their last case of the war, UB116. Diving commenced on 1 November and books and papers 
immediately began to be recovered as the divers edged their way through the usual debris towards 
the control room. On the day of the Armistice more intelligence was recovered, along with the deck 
gun. Salvage Section divers arrived and plans were made to lift the U-boat using YC10, recently 
successful in recovering UB110 (see below) and a sketch of the wreck was made, showing the 
Figure 5. Left: the water stained weather cipher book from the wreck of UC70 (National Archives). Right AB 
George Clear DSM, one of the divers who recovered intelligence from several U-boats in 1918 (HDS Divers 
Index). 
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damage to it (see Figure 6). However on 14 November, with the war now over, the Intelligence 
Division cancelled all further work on the wreck and the site was abandoned. This ended the 
wartime contribution of the Special Section.  
Aside from the work of the Special Section, two other important U-boat cases were worked on by 
the Salvage Section in 1918. First, UB74 sunk off Portland in May was extensively worked on by Davis 
aboard Corycia, with Miller joining him in June. Explosives were used to widen the forward hatch. 
Unlike UB55, the torpedoes did not detonate. The conning tower was also removed using explosives. 
In the only case not involving the Special Section under Damant, intelligence material was recovered 
from this wreck. Conditions, due to its exposed position were difficult and the dives were 
interspersed by bad weather and the repeated need to re-buoy the site. As a consequence diving 
continued into September. Miller suffered a period of illness during this case, although its reasons 
are not stated. 
 
 
 
Another U-boat, UB110 was recovered whole from the seabed by Wheeler and Kay using the lifting 
barge YC10. UB110 had been sunk with survivors in July. Salvage operations began in August. On 
October 5, the salvaged wreck was handed over to the Intelligence Division in the Admiralty dock, 
Jarrow. The extent of the intelligence recovered was reported as very extensive. 
Figure 6. Salvage Section divers sketch of the wreck of UB116 drawn to assist in the aborted plans to recover 
the U-boat whole from Scapa Flow (National Archives).  
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So successful had the Special Section been in the summer of 1918 that by August a diving school for 
special service and further specialist diving vessels, beginning with Ceto were planned. There was to 
be one in each Salvage Section base. Presumably the end of the war terminated this project. 
However, 1918 was not a year where the old problems disappeared entirely. Aside from the cases 
previously mentioned, both at Immingham and Falmouth time was wasted searching for difficult or 
non-existent cases. Nevertheless the tide had turned and the Salvage Section could be justifiably 
proud of its achievements. The Special Section had prized intelligence from five sunken U-boats, 
Davis another and UB110 added a seventh. Prior to 1918, only UC44 had yielded her secrets to the 
Salvage Section, although intelligence had come to the Admiralty from other wrecks and crashed 
Zeppelins. 
 
Where the Tin Openers are known to have dived 
Figure 7 and Table 1 show the locations where it has been verified by archival research that divers 
were deployed to U-boat wrecks. It does not include the cases where divers were sent for but not 
used because the wrecks could not be located. Damant commented in a letter to the Salvage Section 
in 1918 that to have counted these instances would have doubled the number of cases he could list. 
Also, there are likely to be other cases where divers were deployed to non U-boat wrecks, where 
there is insufficient information to plot them on a map. For example, during May 1918 Damant’s 
telegrams to the Salvage Section reveal that his divers examined several non-submarine wrecks in 
the Folkestone area on one tide, and then carried out their U-boat work on the other.  
So fast came the discoveries around Dover in 1918, that record keeping could hardly keep up. There 
was a very noticeable attempt in 1918 to accurately catalogue where the Salvage and Special 
Sections had been diving on U-boats. Damant was requested to write a list of where the divers had 
been, which he duly sent in. Perhaps as a result of this episode it is noted in the records that Damant 
was later furnished with a typewriter and desk whilst on Corycia. It is clear from the Dover and 
Damant records though, that UB55 somehow got listed as two different wrecks, although it is 
unclear whether this oversight is simply bureaucratic or that the divers did not recognise they had 
been on it previously. Equally mysterious is the nonexistent U-boat wreck described as lying next to 
the wreck of UB58 and the enigmatic case of (UC79), detailed in the author’s 2014 UNESCO paper 
and also in his 2014 book. 
Research into this paper has not looked at the records of any of the other Fleet bases asides Dover. 
It is likely that some diving activity may be found at other commands. For example, there is a known 
abortive attempt to find a submarine of Ardrossan in the Salvage Section records. Also, a note in 
Keyes’ diary for 16 August 1918 mysteriously points to another diving group looking for a submarine 
on the Bergues Bank, Belgium. Moreover there are some short gaps in the timelines for Miller and 
Damant. But nevertheless, the number of actual U-boats found and dived is most probably accurate, 
as any discovered U-boats will have most likely involved the Salvage Section at some point; 
especially from 1916 onwards. One absence from this list is UC47, where Spindler’s reference to it 
being dived cannot be reconciled with any other source. It seems more likely that if intelligence was 
found on the site, it was probably recovered floating on the surface. 
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Figure 7. Map showing the locations of all the confirmed sites investigated by divers in WW1. While 
most are now known U-boat wrecks, others have been found to not exist and other cases were found 
by divers during the war to be not present or to be shipwrecks. The brackets around (UC79) denote 
that this is an unconfirmed identification of the wreck itself (Innes McCartney).  
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Name Dates 
(Approx) 
Base Supervisor  
& Vessel 
Depth Notes 
UC2 02/07/1915 to 
24/08/1915 
Lowestoft Ballard 
HMS Halcyon 
8 fathoms Wreck investigated and then blown up. Divers 
Severs (RN) & Bridges (Chatham). Not Salvage 
Section. 
No U-boat 
"a" 
16/01/1916 to 
16/01/1916 
Dover King's Harbour 
Master 
not known 
not stated Dockyard diver finds "U-boat" wreck. Payout 
James Fletcher crew followed. Not Salvage 
Section. 
UC5 01/05/1916 to 
16/05/1916 
Lowestoft Young 
Ranger 
8 feet U-boat salvaged whole. Limited intelligence 
recovered. One diver is listed as PO Gohm.the 
other was probably PO FP Eaglestone. 
UC32 24/02/1917 to 
30/03/1917 
Sunderland SNO Tyne 
2 x MLs, 2 x 
Drifters, 1 x 
Lighter, HMS 
Bonetta 
6 fathoms Torpedo & director recovered. Divers 
mentioned Lt Collier of HMS C13 & PO E W 
Crafter CSC.J.5351 of HMS Bonaventure. 
No U-boat 
"b" 
30/05/1917 to 
09/06/1917 
Penzance Young 
Local Trawler 
28.5 
fathoms 
Diver from Falmouth dockyard 
UC44 08/08/1917 to 
10/12/1917 
Dunmore Davis  
Racer 
14 
fathoms 
Stripped under cliffs in view of public. Taken 
into 30ft of water and dumped 21/11/1917.  
Important intelligence recovered. Divers were 
Gohm.& Eaglestone, the latter awarded the 
DSM. 
UC41 23/08/1917 to 
08/10/1917 
Dundee McGuffie 
Melita 
11 
fathoms 
Salvage cancelled 2/10/17, presumably 
because UC44 successful. No intelligence 
recovered.  
UC42 02/11/1917 to 
11/12/1917 
Queenstown not known 15 
fathoms 
Diver from Queenstown dockyard. U-boat 
identified by brass plate. No intelligence 
recovered. Not Salvage Section. 
No U-boat 
"c" 
26/09/1917 to Dover Malet 
Anchorite 
not stated "submarine destroyed by Wren is an old 
wreck" Diver recorded as Self 
UB81 30/12/1917 to 
18/02/1918 
Portsmouth Damant 
Dockyard 
vessel 
15 
fathoms 
Lift abandoned in winter 1917 after a long 
spate of poor weather. 
No U-boat 
"d" 
24/03/1918 to 
28/04/1918 
Newquay Vine 
Local Drifter 
21 
fathoms 
Recommended by Damant as too difficult to 
lift. No U-boat wreck known in area. Diver 
Miller. 
UB16 03/05/1918 to 
20/05/1918 
Harwich Damant 
Moonfleet 
14 
fathoms 
Could only find fragments of wreck, even 
though U-boat captain survived sinking 
UB33 21/05/1918 to 
30/05/1918 
Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
14 
fathoms 
Lifting cancelled and explosives used. Miller & 
Clear recorded in report. 
UC39 31/05/1918 to 
13/06/1918 
Immingham Damant 
Moonfleet 
17 
fathoms 
Looking for UC75 - not found. But found the 
older UC39 
UB74 01/06/1918 to 
03/09/1918 
Portland Davis 
Corycia   
21 
fathoms 
Gelignite used. Gun removed. Miller present 
on site from June also Balson mentioned. 
UC11 28/06/1918 to 
02/07/1918 
Harwich Damant 
Moonfleet 
not stated TNT used twice - 2nd occasion ignited mines.  
Important intelligence recovered. 
UC64 04/07/1918 to 
02/08/1918 
Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
22 
fathoms 
Explosives used to blow away tower and 
widen lower hatch. Little intelligence found. 
UB110 02/07/1918 In 
dry dock on 
5/10/1918 
Redcar Wheeler & Kay  
YC10 
not stated U-boat salvaged whole. Important intelligence 
recovered. Divers: Hommet & Morris (RN) & 
Oates (dockyard). 
UB55a 15/07/1918 Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
not stated The site dived was probably UB55 (first time) 
UB38 16/07/1918 Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
not stated Located small U-boat sunk for some moths. 
No U-boat 
"e" 
18/07/1918 to 
28/07/1918 
Immingham Wheeler 12 
fathoms 
Large steamer located. Previously stated by 
Navy divers to be a large U-boat. 
(UC79) 07/08/1918 Dover Damant  
Moonfleet 
18 
fathoms 
UC damaged fwd with much marine growth  
No U-boat 
"f" 
09/08/1918 Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
not stated "blown to pieces - very old" No wreck known 
at position 
UB58 10/08/1918 to Dover Damant not stated Bows blown off - down several months. 
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12/08/1918 Moonfleet 105mm gun removed. 
UB56 12/08/1918 Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
not stated Found old U-boat - stern blown in and full of 
sand 
UB30 13/08/1918 to 
15/08/1918 
Whitby Wheeler 
Not known 
27.5 
fathoms 
Some items recovered steering & compass. 
Abandoned to concentrate on UB110 
UB55b 14/08/1918 to 
22/08/1918 
Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
not stated 88m gun removed. Explosives used which 
blew up bow torpedoes. "Found" on 14/8/18 
but probably first dived on in July. “Some 
material” recovered. 
No U-boat 
"g" 
Report of 
15/8/1918 
Falmouth George 
Not known 
not stated Obstruction found to be rocks 
UB109 29/08/1918 to 
25/09/1918 
Dover Damant 
Moonfleet 
12 
fathoms 
Notebook recovered from coat pocket.  
Important intelligence recovered. Divers 
Blachford & Clear 
UC70 06/09/1918 to 
29/10/1918 
Whitby Damant 
Corycia 
14 
fathoms 
Wreck found on 6/9/18 but waited until 
Damant arrived. Body in conning tower. 
Important intelligence recovered. Divers 
Blachford & Clear 
UB116 29/10/1918 to 
14/11/1918 
Scapa Flow Damant 
Corycia 
80 feet Gun raised. Intelligence recovered. 
      
 
 
The Tin Opener’s Archaeological Footprint 
The author has dived and recorded a number of the sites worked on by the Salvage Section. No 
discernible evidence of their presence was seen on UB81 and UB38. In 2014 the sites of UB33 and 
UB56 were found to be buried under sand and not currently worth attempting to dive. Several 
wrecks do however manifest obvious archaeological evidence of the presence of the Salvage Section 
divers and the specific details of UB55, UB58, (UC79), UB109, and UB74 are described in the author’s 
2014 book.  
A case which is typical of the archaeological footprint left by the Tin Openers is the case of UC64. 
The U-boat was mined outbound on 20 June 1918 in the Dover barrage. The Special Section first 
dived the site on 5 July. The wreck was found to have been sunk by a mine detonation underneath 
the control room, which forced the underside ten feet upwards into the hull, compressing 
everything inside. In order to ease the very difficult work of getting into the control room, explosives 
were used to remove the conning tower and widen the lower hatch (as in the cases of UB33 and 
UC11). This time no sympathetic explosion occurred. The divers were able to enter the control room, 
but it was much crushed and only personal items from the dead were recovered, although it seems 
these were enough to identify the wreck. 
A survey on 2 August 2014 revealed that wreck resembles the contemporary description well. The 
details in Figure 8 are described as: Images A) The deck gun has fallen onto the seabed, where the 
submarine has broken in half in front of where the conning would have been. This forward break is 
possibly unrelated to the 1918 dives; being caused by stresses in the decomposing wreckage. B) The 
Herz horn of a mine is clearly visible in this photo. All the chutes are full, as was described in 1918. C) 
The major blast damage from the mine explosion under the control room still dominates the visible 
areas of damage on the wreck. D) The external torpedo tubes are present, although the extra 
torpedoes (without warheads) reported stowed on deck are not present. E&G) The conning tower 
was found on the seabed on the port side of the wreck, with the periscope still running through it.  
Table 1. A list of all of the known U-boat sites to have been inspected by divers during WW1. All these cases 
are confirmed by archival research and the results of the dives are given. Figure 7 is a map showing their 
locations (Innes McCartney).  
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Figure 8. Diagram of UC64 as seen in 2014. The impact of the Special Section divers can be seen by the 
blasted remains of the conning tower. The rest of the wreck fits their descriptions (Innes McCartney).  
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The top portion has been ripped open, presumably by the charge which removed it. F) The engine 
room hatch is open. It is not known whether the 1918 divers opened it. G) The stern torpedo tube 
marks the aft part of the wreck. 
In this instance the footprint of the Special Section is clear to see in the evidence of the removal of 
the conning tower and their overall description of the wreck. It was a memorable survey dive, 
because apart from the need to record the technical features of the wreck, the evidence for the 
1918 dives was just as important to record. The wreck of UC64 is made all the more special as a dive 
because of its association with the Tin Openers. 
Conclusions 
This paper has aimed to accurately depict the diving on U-boats in WW1, based on what can be 
verified by archival research and diving. Although far from comprehensive, a timeline of events has 
emerged, alongside the key achievements of the divers themselves. One of the main findings during 
the research was the extent to which the years 1915-17 were marked by much trial and error which 
later paid off in 1918. The Tin Openers’ task was never an easy one and such descriptions that it was 
ring of the triumphant, such as the Director of Naval Intelligence Admiral Hall’s note that the divers 
were instructed to: 
“open torpedo-hatch, open five watertight doors, turn sharp right and retrieve top drawer 
in which were all papers” 
With a century now passed since the Special Section carried out its dives, it is easy to forget the 
challenges they faced. The foremost of which was actually finding the wrecks in the first place. In 
navigational terms, only dead reckoning existed. So a certain degree of chance was involved in 
relocating the supposed sunken U-boat. It is no surprise therefore that in nearly every case of the 22 
U-boats known to have been dived, the U-boat was witnessed to sink or survivors were picked up. 
Immediate buoying of the sites helped, as did the navigation scheme surrounding the Dover 
minefield.  
The sharp upswing in sites dived in 1918 is of course due to the success (albeit late in the war) of the 
Dover minefield. Eight cases off Dover were successfully surveyed by the divers in that year, 
although only two yielded significant intelligence hauls. In Dover in particular, both Bacon and 
especially Keyes were keen to show the successes being achieved. The Dover Command records 
augment the Salvage Section files and provide a quite detailed history of the diving off Dover in 1918 
with its successes and frustrations. 
It should also be borne in mind the more limited depth the divers could reach and work in than 
today and the far greater risks taken with decompression issues. Working inside the remains of 
freshly destroyed U-boats took the sort of courage it is difficult to comprehend. The readers of this 
paper have not been spared some of the grim depictions of the work of Blachford and Clear in 
particular, who had to clear out U-boats with their bare hands while looking for precious intelligence 
papers. In the Dover area there was also the risk of diving in a minefield which Damant later recalled 
in a letter: 
“..these men were diving almost daily in the active minefield between Dover and 
Grisnez. It was well known to them that the explosion of a mine within a mile of the 
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operations would be fatal to the diver. No steps could be taken to avoid the mines, the 
men had to dive right amongst them and in fact sighted them under water at a 
distance of 10ft or less on more than one occasion. They also entered and placed 
charges within damaged Enemy Submarines (sic) having active mines and torpedoes in 
the tubes. 
On several days the divers were severely shaken by the explosion of Depth Charges 
during attacks on enemy submarines within a short distance. On one occasion the 
shock was so great as to bang down the hatch on top of a diver who was working 
inside a submarine. He had great difficulty in forcing it up again to get out. 
They never hesitated to go down and never even has a man left the bottom without 
orders during a Depth Charge attack.” 
The initial motivation to research this subject was to learn what might be seen of the Tin Openers 
activities when the sites were surveyed by diving. The wrecks themselves, often also the graves of 
German submariners, represent perhaps the greatest memorial to the pioneering and dangerous 
work of the diver and the submariner during WW1. While research continues, it is felt that the 
anniversary of the war marked an appropriate opportunity to present the results as they are 
currently known. 
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Robert M. Grant 1917-2014; a scholar and colleague who 
more than many shed light into the murky recesses of WW1 U-boat history. 
I am greatly indebted to both Dr. John Bevan and Gary Wallace-Potter of the Historical Diving Society 
for generously guiding me to valuable sources of information and to Michael Lowrey for reading 
drafts of this paper and making suggestions. All errors are my own. 
 
Dr I McCartney 
November 2014 
 
Postscript: Separating Fact from Fiction - the “Tin Openers” through history 
Files available today in the National Archives, coupled with a detailed hydrographic record and an 
increasingly accurate list of U-boats destroyed makes it possible to research a focused list of U-boat 
wrecks visited by divers during WW1. However, for much of the last 100 years this has not been the 
case and the literature on this subject has naturally reflected the shallower depth of historical 
knowledge that existed at different periods in the past. This section attempts to show how the 
literature has developed since 1918 and how some semi-fictionalised accounts endured to the 
present day. 
In the immediate post-war years there was naturally a reticence by the Admiralty to release any 
information relating to its ways and means of gathering intelligence on the enemy. The first books to 
be published on Admiralty intelligence (sometimes referred to as Room 40, the cryptographic office) 
by individuals who either worked there or knew a little of it were therefore published without 
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Admiralty consent and its authors were not allowed to consult Admiralty files, but had to work from 
memory e.g. Hoy, 1932 and James, 1955.  
The earliest published source identified by the author that specifically mentions diver inspections of 
sunken U-boats is Newbolt (1918). He later became the official historian of the Royal Navy in WW1 
and certainly had access to key documents. Nevertheless the details are deliberately vague because 
Newbolt, perhaps more than anyone else had to work under naval censorship. The reader will note 
above, that since the main case he mentioned was a false one, there would have been little harm in 
divulging it. 
Hunger clearly existed for information on the intelligence war and into the vacuum created by 
Admiralty silence poured numerous publications which contained tales whose provenance was 
difficult to substantiate. Within these came some of the first details of diving on and the full salvage 
of U-boat wrecks and the impact of this work on the path of the war. Notable examples of this genre 
include Bywater 1932 and Chatterton 1936. 
In fact the salvage whole of U-boats from the sea was difficult to hide in wartime and in 
consequence difficult to deny thereafter. This is especially so considering that UC5 became a public 
exhibit, UC44 was landed and stripped on a beach in view of passers-by and UB110 was brought into 
dry dock on the Tyne. These are cases which became known to the public during the 1920’s and 30’s 
through books such as Masters 1924, 1932 and 1938.  
However, outside of complete salvage from the seabed, the intelligence story of dives to U-boat 
wrecks remained silent, kept its mystique and the vacuum remained; with one notable exception. 
The earliest and doubtless the most influential semi-fictionalised account of these dives appeared in 
the Saturday Evening Post (a general interest magazine published in the US) in 1926. Entitled “A War 
Secret” and penned by unnamed hand (possibly the journalist Richard Rowan), it claimed to be an 
interview with the diver Miller and to have had official Admiralty sanction. This highly embellished 
tale of diving on a number of U-boat wrecks contained some grains of truth which was interwoven 
with tales of dangerous sea creatures and wrecks full of officers etc. One of its more outlandish 
claims was that Miller had dived on 60 U-boat wrecks during the war. Far more factual accounts of 
diving on UB33 (Davis 1935) and UB74 (The Seagoer 1937) seem to have passed generally unnoticed. 
Nevertheless in the post-war world where the secret work of Naval Intelligence was not being made 
public, the Saturday Evening Post article in particular endured. In the absence of much more it was 
cited in a number of notable historical works, e.g. Kahn 1968 and Andrew 1987. But it was in the 
diving community where this paper had its greatest and longest lasting impact. This is because it was 
the key source used by the journalist and author Kendall McDonald in his 1998 articles in DIVER 
magazine and his 2003 book, The Tin Openers; (a name by which it seems the divers are now 
commonly referred). Only four cases out of 11 mentioned in McDonald’s book have any basis in fact. 
In reality the release of the Dover Command files in 1969 and the release of the Admiralty Salvage 
Section records 1970-1975 brought the truth to light. The first in depth research carried out on these 
records and their impact on our current understanding of the intelligence war was carried out by 
Robert M Grant, assisted by Capt. A. B. Sainsbury, although their manuscript did not find a publisher 
until 2003. All that remained to finally reveal the full historical picture was an accurate record of 
where the U-boats wrecks actually lay. 
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The discovery by amateur divers of so many U-boat wrecks in recent years has finally enabled a truer 
picture of the actual dispersal of the U-boat wrecks themselves to be understood. Against this list, 
the archival evidence could be empirically benchmarked and the final piece of the jigsaw could be 
put in place. The results of this fusion of archival sources and hydrographic data are the basis of this 
paper. 
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